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Reducing Waste with an Efficient 
Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit 
 
When Congress was debating the Medicare drug benefit in 2003, there 
were many who advocated that Medicare provide the benefit as part of 
the traditional hospital insurance program. This was expected to save 
money both due to lower administrative costs and also as result of 
Medicare’s ability to use its market power to directly negotiate lower 
prices with the pharmaceutical industry. The plan that was passed instead 
required beneficiaries to purchase insurance from private insurers who 
would be subsidized by the government. 
 
It has been widely noted that the drug benefit has cost considerably less 
than expected. In 2004, the Medicare Trustees projected that the Part D 
benefit would cost $131.4 billion in 2011, the most recent year for which 
data is available. In fact, the benefit cost $67.4 billion in 2011, just 51.3 
percent of the originally projected cost.1 
 
While advocates of using private insurers have claimed that lower than 
projected costs vindicate their design for the benefit, in fact the main 
reason that costs have been less than projected is that drug costs in 
general have risen much less rapidly than had been projected. In 2005, the 
Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) projected that the 
country would spend $403.7 billion on prescription drugs in 2014. 2 
(These were the first projections that incorporated the impact of the 
Medicare prescription drug benefit, and 2014 is chosen because the 
projections jump from 2006 to 2014.) The 2011 projections showed 
expenditures of $308.7 billion for 2014, or 59.2 percent of the 2005 
projection.3 
 
While there are undoubtedly many factors underlying the slower than 
projected increase in drug costs, the main factor is a decline in the pace of 
innovation. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) rates the 
importance of new drugs in their approval process. It fast tracks drugs 
that are considered “priority” drugs, meaning that they are potentially a 
qualitative improvement over existing drugs. In the 1990s, there was an 
average of 13.4 priority approvals a year of new molecular entities. This 
fell to 10.0 a year between 2004 and 2009, a 25 percent drop.4 Given the 
expected increase in expenditures on prescription drugs, and the increase 
in research spending claimed by the industry, it would have been expected 
that instead of falling, the number of priority approvals would have 
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increased substantially. 
 
With fewer important new drugs being developed and patents expiring on many important existing 
drugs, it should not have been surprising that the increase in drug expenditures would slow. It is 
likely that this slower pace of innovation in the drug industry is a more important factor in 
explaining lower than projected costs than the role of private insurers in delivering the benefit. 
 
However even with lower than projected costs, the United States still is spending far more per 
person on prescription drugs than other wealthy countries. In 2012 the United States was projected 
to spend $883 per person on prescription drugs.5 This is nearly twice as high as per person spending 
in other wealthy countries. Figure 1 shows the ratio of per person spending on prescription drugs in 
the United States to spending in Canada, Denmark, Germany, and the United Kingdom. For 
example, Canada spends a bit over 70 cents for each dollar spent in the U.S. per person on 
prescription drugs. The United Kingdom spends just under 40 cents, and Denmark only about 35 
cents per dollar spent in the U.S. 
 
FIGURE 1 
 Ratio of Per Capita Prescription Drug Spending to U.S. Spending, 2008, Selected Countries. 
 
Source: Author's calculations and OECD Health Care Statistics. See appendix for details. 
 
The reason that other countries spend so much less on prescription drugs is that their governments 
negotiate prices with the pharmaceutical industry. While governments are granting the industry 
patent monopolies that prevent competitors from selling the same drug at a lower price, they do not 
allow drug companies to charge whatever price they want. In principle, the U.S. government could 
adopt the same approach with Medicare. Medicare provides a huge market, far larger than most 
countries. This should allow it to negotiate prices that are the same or lower prices than what other 
countries pay.  
 
Table 1 and Table 2 show the projected saving to the government and to beneficiaries if Medicare 
were to pay the same amount for prescription drugs as other countries. In the low savings case, 
where the United States spends as much on drugs as Canada, the cumulative savings to the federal 
government over the next decade would be $229.7 billion. In addition, the savings to state 
governments would be $30.8 billion, while beneficiaries would save $47.7 billion in lower premiums. 
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TABLE 1 
Source of Payment for Medicare Part D (in billions) 
    
Beneficiaries' 
Premiums 
Federal 
Government 
State 
Governments 
2013 
 
$10.7 $59.8 $8.9 
2014 
 
12.5 63.5 9.2 
2015 
 
14.4 68.1 9.5 
2016 
 
15.6 74.9 10.2 
2017 
 
17.4 81.2 10.9 
2018 
 
19.1 88.4 11.8 
2019 
 
21.1 96.4 12.7 
2020 
 
23 106.4 13.8 
2021 
 
24.2 116.7 15.1 
Author's calculations, Medicare Trustees Report, and 
Congressional Budget Office.  See appendix for details and 
methodology. 
 
 
TABLE 2 
Savings from Negotiated Drug Prices (in billions) 
  
Savings to 
Beneficiaries 
Savings to Federal 
Government 
Savings to State 
Governments 
(a) Low Savings (Canadian Prices) 
2013 
 
$2.8 $15.5 $2.3 
2014 
 
3.2 16.5 2.4 
2015 
 
3.7 17.7 2.5 
2016 
 
4.1 19.5 2.7 
2017 
 
4.5 21.1 2.8 
2018 
 
5.0 23.0 3.1 
2019 
 
5.5 25.1 3.3 
2020 
 
6.0 27.7 3.6 
2021 
 
6.3 30.3 3.9 
2022 
 
6.6 33.3 4.3 
Total   $47.7 $229.7 $30.8 
     (b) High Savings (Danish Prices) 
2013 
 
$6.6 $36.6 $5.5 
2014 
 
7.7 38.9 5.6 
2015 
 
8.8 41.7 5.8 
2016 
 
9.6 45.9 6.2 
2017 
 
10.7 49.8 6.7 
2018 
 
11.7 54.2 7.2 
2019 
 
12.9 59.1 7.8 
2020 
 
14.1 65.2 8.5 
2021 
 
14.8 71.5 9.3 
2022 
 
15.6 78.4 10.1 
Total   $112.4 $541.3 $72.7 
Source: Author's calculations, Medicare Trustees Report, and Congressional Budget Office.  See 
appendix for details and methodology. 
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In the high saving case, where we paid the same amount for our drugs as people in Denmark, the 
savings to the federal government over the next decade would be $541.3 billion. The saving to the 
states would be $72.7 billion, and beneficiaries would save $112.4 billion. 
 
It is worth briefly discussing an objection that the pharmaceutical industry often makes to allowing 
Medicare to negotiate lower drug prices. It claims that the high prices in the United States provide 
much of the revenue and incentive to finance research into new drugs. While it is true that the 
profits from patent monopolies do provide an incentive to conduct research, they also provide an 
incentive to market drugs for uses that may be inappropriate and to misrepresent evidence on the 
quality and safety of drugs. This is the reason that there have been so many scandals in recent years 
such as the one involving Vioxx, where it is alleged that Merck concealed evidence that the drug 
increased the risks of heart attacks and strokes. 6  The perverse incentives created by patent 
monopolies also have led to the corruption of scientific research, which is a widely recognized 
problem among medical researchers.7 
 
Lower profit margins will reduce the incentive for this sort of corruption, which presumably means 
that we can anticipate that the drug companies will be more honest in marketing their drugs and 
revealing their research findings. There are alternative mechanisms for supporting biomedical 
research that are less susceptible to the same sort of corruption. The government already funds $30 
billion a year in biomedical research through the National Institutes of Health. While most of this 
research is focused on more basic science, there is no reason in principle that additional funding 
could not be directed toward developing drugs and bringing them through the Food and Drug 
Administration’s approval process.8  
 
Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz has suggested that the government finance the clinical testing portion 
of the drug development process.9 This is the area most prone to corruption. It is also the area in 
which full public disclosure of data is likely to offer the greatest benefits. Full disclosure would allow 
doctors to know the overall effectiveness of drugs relative to competitors. It would also enable 
researchers to mine data to find interaction effects between drugs and evidence that some drugs 
might be more effective for particular types of patients than others.  
 
Conclusion 
Patients in the United States pay far higher prices for prescription drugs than do people in other 
wealthy countries. This is true for the Medicare prescription drug program also. If Medicare 
negotiated drug prices so that beneficiaries paid the same amount as people in other countries, there 
would be enormous potential savings. For example, if beneficiaries paid the same prices as people in 
Canada, the federal government would save almost $230 billion over the next decade, along with 
states saving $31 billion and beneficiaries saving $48 billion. If the program negotiated the same 
prices as are paid in Denmark, the savings to the federal coffers would be $541 billion. States would 
save $73 billion and beneficiaries would save $112 billion. 
 
The effect of such price reductions on the innovation process would be mixed. While there would 
be less incentive to develop new drugs, there would also be less incentive to improperly market 
drugs and to misrepresent research findings. In the longer run, it would be desirable to develop a 
more efficient system for financing drug research which would eliminate the sort of corruption that 
is an inevitable result of government granted patent monopolies.  
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Appendix 
Figure 1 takes per capita spending in purchasing power parity dollars from the OECD’s Health Care 
Statistics 2012, available at http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=SHA. The bars show the 
ratios for 2008, the most recent year for which data is available. 
 
Table 2 uses the projected sources of revenues from the 2012 Medicare Trustees Report, Table 
III.D3. The 2022 numbers are taken by projecting the growth rate from each source of revenue 
from 2020 to 2021 on the 2021 numbers. The savings are calculated by applying the ratio of drug 
spending in Canada (low savings) and Denmark (high savings) to actual spending on drugs in Part 
D. To get spending on drugs, the direct administrative costs of the Medicare program were 
subtracted from total spending (found in Table III.D3) as were the administrative costs of the 
insurers providing the benefit. The latter were projected as 6 percent of the cost of the program by 
the Congressional Budget Office.10 Together, the projected cost of the drugs purchased under the 
program was assumed to be 93.5 percent of spending. The saving from lower cost drugs are 
assumed to be proportional to what beneficiaries, the federal government and state governments 
paid into the program.  
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